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WITHDRAWING FROM CUSTOM AND THE 
PARADOX OF CONSENSUALISM IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
C.L. LIM* & OLUFEMI ELIAS** 
INTRODUCTION 
In their excellent article, Withdrawing from International Custom, 
Professors Curtis Bradley and Mitu Gulati call into question the prevailing 
conception of customary international law, according to which states 
“never have the legal right to withdraw unilaterally from customary law” 
(the “Mandatory View”).1 Bradley and Gulati question the intellectual 
history and functional desirability of the Mandatory View, and they 
identify “significant uncertainties about how the Mandatory View would 
work in practice.”2 Their observations appear to us to be convincing. If the 
basis of the Mandatory View is not convincing, then its main tenets, such 
as the absence of a right of withdrawal, must also fall. Without focusing 
directly on the question of whether there exists a right of unilateral 
withdrawal from customary international law, we have also previously 
rejected the prevailing conception of customary international law on other 
grounds.3 In this paper, we will amplify a number of issues we had raised 
in our critique of the prevailing view. We will sketch a consensual 
explanation of customary international law that is based on how states 
argue about international custom. We will argue that taking empiricism 
seriously means eschewing literal readings of state practice. It means doing 
more than focusing on what states say about what they do, and instead 
examining what they actually do. We will argue that such a consensual 
explanation provides a better context in which to examine the question of 
withdrawal from custom. 
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 1. Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202 
(2010). 
 2. See generally id. 
 3. O.A. ELIAS & C.L. LIM, THE PARADOX OF CONSENSUALISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998). 
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I. RULES ABOUT CUSTOM AS RULES OF CUSTOM 
A discussion of the conditions under which withdrawal from 
customary law is permissible is necessarily a discussion of the nature of the 
rules that govern the operation of customary law (such as the rules on how 
customary law rights and obligations are created and changed). The 
question that arises here has been posed as follows: “Do propositions about 
the sources of law require empirical support? Or, on the contrary, is 
deduction from a set of postulates that define the international legal order a 
sufficient basis for their validity?”4 In other words, how does one establish 
whether withdrawal from custom is or is not permissible? Is there a 
difference between the way in which the law on permissibility of 
withdrawal, or on the effect of persistent objection, is to be established, on 
the one hand, and the way in which ordinary substantive rules of custom 
are proved, on the other?5 
The predominant view today provides the following affirmative 
answer: “A persistent objector rule makes the applicable customary 
international law rule depend on timely, actual and persistent dissent to a 
general rule on the part of the objecting state, but applying a general rule of 
custom (i.e. an ordinary substantive rule) to a state does not require the 
consent of that state to that general rule.” This view would run into 
problems since the latter application of a customary international law rule 
depends neither on non-dissent nor consent on the part of that state where 
such non-dissent or consent would at least be empirically verifiable. What 
is left instead is a form of deduction. Deduction from a set of postulates 
that cannot be traced to a positivist source of law can be authoritative as 
accurate prescription only up to a point. If international practice—in 
statements made by states explaining their actions, or in judicial 
decisions—supports something different from conclusions based on the 
reasoning of scholars, the validity and the usefulness of those conclusions 
would be called into serious question. The fact is that states and tribunals, 
applying international law, refer to empirically verifiable criteria—i.e. 
practice and opinio juris—to establish the existence of rules of customary 
law.6 If there is law on how customary law changes, as indeed there must 
be, the best way (or at least a very important way) to know its content is to 
 
 4. Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent 
Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 457, 461 n.13 (1985). 
 5. For excellent recent discussion of issues surrounding this problem, see Jörg Kammerhofer, 
Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary International Law and Some of Its 
Problems, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 523 (2004). 
 6. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 3 
Bevans 1179. 
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refer to the practice of those who make and identify the law.7 In this sense, 
empiricism has instructive value even if there is some other, better way of 
ascertaining the truth of propositions of law regarding the operation of 
custom. 
However, such international practice, which empiricism upholds as a 
criterion for legal validity, can be read in two different ways. First, it can be 
read literally, i.e., it can be read with a view to finding a literal answer in 
what states say about what they do, to questions such as: Is there a 
persistent objector rule? What are the conditions for qualification as a 
persistent objector? How widespread must practice be for it to lead to a 
new custom? When, if ever, can a state withdraw from customary law? 
Second, it can be read in context, with a view to finding out what states 
actually do. We will begin with the first. 
II. CONCEPTIONS OF THE ROLE OF CONSENT IN CUSTOMARY 
LAW: THE INCOHERENCE OF THE PERSISTENT OBJECTOR 
THEORY 
The discussion of a right to withdraw from customary international 
law is a discussion of the right to withdraw consent to a particular rule of 
customary law; withdrawal is surely an act of will. The discussion is 
therefore about the role of consent in customary international law viewed 
from a particular aspect. A number of conceptions of the role of consent in 
customary international law have been expressed.8 These conceptions range 
from those at one end of the spectrum according to which, for various 
reasons, the consent or practice of states plays a minimal role,9 to those at 
 
 7. See, e.g., A.V. Lowe, Do General Rules of International Law Exist?, 9 REV. INT’L STUD. 207, 
209 (1983) (“The secondary rule of law-creation will itself be a rule of customary international law 
derived from state practice . . . .”); K. Venkata Raman, Toward a General Theory of International 
Customary Law, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MYRES S. 
MCDOUGAL 365, 367 (W. Michael Reisman & Burns H. Weston eds., 1976) (“[T]he so-called pre-
existing rule of law, entailing legal obligation by customary practice, is itself a product of customary 
practice.”); JAN H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 32 (1968) (“[I]n any 
legal order, the question regarding the birth of customary law must be answered in accordance with the 
positive . . . law obtaining in it in respect of the formation of law.”); LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: POLITICS & VALUES 32 (1995) (“The norm governing the making of customary law—the 
requirement of consistent general practice plus opinio juris—is based on the constitutional conceptions 
of the State system, but developed by custom.”). For a contrary view, see Kammerhofer, supra note 5, 
at 545 (arguing that the method of looking to State practice plus opinio juris to answer this question is 
flawed because it “presupposes a method of proof which itself is the object of the investigation”). 
 8. ELIAS & LIM, supra note 3, at 29-33. 
 9. See, e.g., International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 174, at 
175-78 (July 11) (dissenting opinion of Judge Alvarez); Lazare Kopelmanas, Custom as a Means of the 
Creation of International Law, 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 148 (1937); Georges Scelle, Règles générales du 
LIM_ELIAS_FMT3.DOC 1/7/2011  1:39:12 PM 
146 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 21:143 
the other end according to which no general rule of customary international 
law will arise if some states, or maybe a state, objects to that rule.10 These 
conceptions do not enjoy support in practice or in academic opinion.11 
Two other conceptions enjoy greater support. The first holds that rules 
of customary international law are created by a system of majority rule 
(whatever the required majority may be), and that the fact that an individual 
state has not accepted or has never objected to this rule does not prevent the 
applicability of the rule to that state.12 A variant of this conception makes 
an exception and holds that while customary international law applies to all 
states, it will not be applicable to persistent objectors, i.e., states that have 
unequivocally and consistently manifested their dissent from the rule 
during its formation. Subsequent objectors, however, are bound. Both 
variants of this conception cover what Bradley and Gulati describe as the 
Mandatory View—”mandatory” because there is no right to withdraw 
unilaterally from custom once it is established.13 A second conception 
holds that rules of customary international law are “not applicable to a 
particular state unless that state has in some way consented to that rule” 
(the “consensual theory”).14 According to this view, a general customary 
rule is only an aggregate of individual acts of consent.15 While the 
assumption in the Mandatory View is that a rule of custom applies to all 
states, the starting point in the consensual theory is the consent of the 
individual state against whom the rule of custom in question is sought to be 
applied. 
Empirical observation has led to the conclusion that the practice of 
states regarding the role of consent in the customary international law 
process has not been uniform because states have expressed different views 
 
droit de la paix, 46 RECUEIL DES COURS 434 (1933-IV) (Neth.); Louis Le Fur, Règles générales du 
droit de la paix, 54 RECUEIL DES COURS 198 (1935) (Neth.). 
 10. See, e.g., S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 103 (Sep. 7) (dissenting 
opinion of Judge Altamira’s) ; Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 at 89-90 (July 25) 
(separate opinion of Judge de Castro) (“For an international custom to come into existence, the fact that 
a rule may be adopted by several States in their municipal legislation, in treaties and conventions, or 
may be applied in arbitral decisions is not sufficient, if other States adopt a different rule.”). 
 11. ELIAS & LIM, supra note 3, at 37-38. 
 12. See, e.g., Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State Practice in a Divided World, in 
THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 513, 531-32 (Ronald St. J. Macdonald & 
David M. Johnston eds., 1983); Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development 
of Customary International Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 1-2 (1985); Luigi Condorelli, Custom, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 179, 202-07 ( Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991). 
 13. The difference between the two variants in this conception is that, according to the first 
variant, the persistent objector theory does not have a basis in practice or in principle. 
 14. ELIAS & LIM, supra note 3, at 31. 
 15. See id. at 130-34. 
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on the matter.16 Furthermore, the manner in which states argue about 
customary international law is complex, and the context in which such 
claims are made is perhaps more illuminating than the claims themselves. 
We shall return to this issue in the next section. In the meantime, two 
pertinent propositions can be put forward. The first is that, as has been 
recognized by a significant body of opinion, “in the absence of clearly 
established general rules, the legal issue has continued to present itself in 
terms of the opposability of the claim to [an]other state rather than of the 
absolute legality or illegality of the claim erga omnes; in other words, in 
terms of the acceptance or acquiescence of other states.”17 The second is 
that commentators have invariably noted the paucity of examples of practice 
or judicial decisions supporting the persistent objector rule, and with it the 
Mandatory View.18 Consent is central to the creation of customary law 
obligations, but that consent is not the version proffered by the Mandatory 
View and the persistent objector theory. 
The difference between the consensual theory and the Mandatory View 
with regard to the role of state consent is that the Mandatory View conditions 
 
 16. Id. at 112-113. See also, e.g., Ielbo M. Lobo de Souza, The Role of State Consent in the 
Customary Process, 44 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 521, 539 (1995) (“[T]here is not a common view among the 
States about the idea of consent and its role in the customary process . . . it is not at all clear how precisely 
each State perceives it . . . . The first conclusion one could formulate is that there is no rule which prescribes 
that the consent of all States is a necessary condition to the formation of a general customary rule. The 
second conclusion is that there is no universally recognized rule which would replace the ‘all consent’ 
rule.”). See also Hidemi Suganami, A.V. Lowe on General Rules of International Law, 10 REV. INT’L. STUD. 
175, 175 (1984) (“It seems somewhat doubtful that an investigation into state practice can reveal 
conclusively whether, according to the secondary rule, a generally accepted rule of customary law is binding 
on a state unless it persistently objects, or whether a state, unless it is a persistent objector, is presumed to 
have consented to it, and is therefore bound by it.”). 
 17. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 35 (July 25) (separate opinion of Judge 
Sir Humphrey Waldock). See also ELIAS & LIM, supra note 3, ch. VI; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (6th ed. 2003) (explaining that in the absence of a general practice, 
customary law becomes “a network of special relations based on opposability, acquiescence, and 
historic title”); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 346-347 (1986); Lowe, 
supra note 7, at 209-11; Donald W. Greig, Reflections on the Role of Consent, 7 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 
125, 173 (1988-89) (“If, as seems to be generally accepted, a new or different rule can become 
established amongst a regional or other grouping of States in derogation from the general rule, there 
would seem to be no reason in theory why the same should not be true in reverse. It is perfectly possible 
for a group of States to adhere to a former rule in the face of evidence of State conduct moving towards 
acceptance of a new rule. Indeed, the new rule may well become established amongst the States 
adhering to it. Admittedly this creates difficulties in determining the rule to be applied in relations 
between States promoting different rules to a particular situation. However, this is not an uncommon 
problem.”); Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 30 
(1974-75). 
 18. Charney, supra note 12, and Stein, supra note 4, at 459, both underline the paucity of 
examples of the application of the persistent objector rule. See also O. Elias, Persistent Objector, in 
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, para. 18 (2009). 
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the operation of consent on a number of formalities, namely, actual dissent, 
timeliness and persistence. But problems arise largely because the Mandatory 
View demands and assumes a high degree of legal certainty in the operation 
of customary law. However, such certainty is notoriously lacking, both in 
relation to the formation of customary law and in relation to the content of the 
persistent objector rule itself. First, the difficulties in knowing when a rule of 
customary law comes into existence are well-known and have been discussed 
extensively.19 There is no certainty regarding the requirements of generality, 
consistency and uniformity of the practice required of the rule. The difficulties 
with the subjective element, opinio juris, are even more notorious. In addition, 
customary law is an ever-evolving process of claim and response.20 Even in 
areas where there might be said to be settled general rules, these rules are 
constantly being added to and subtracted from.21 These considerations deprive 
the so-called persistent objector rule of its intended utility, as the exercise of 
the right to dissent depends on the existence of a general rule from which to 
dissent. Is dissent supposed to be expressed from the earliest articulations of a 
nascent rule, at the time of creation, or soon thereafter? Then how persistent, 
and consistent, must the persistent objector be?22 These ill-defined formal 
requirements do not feature in a true consensual explanation, which looks to 
whether there has been some kind of consent. 
Further problems exist. The persistent objector rule is meant to be the 
safeguard for the essentially democratic and consensual nature of customary 
law.23 The rule gives states the chance to exempt themselves from a rule of 
customary law before that rule is established and, presumably in the interests 
of legal certainty, states cannot exempt themselves thereafter.24 But equating 
 
 19. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 7, at 29-31. 
 20. See Myres S. McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49 AM. 
J.  INT’L L. 356, 356-57 (1955). 
 21. See generally, Maurice H. Mendelson, State Acts and Omissions as Explicit or Implicit 
Claims, in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU SERVICE DE LA PAIX, DE LA JUSTICE  ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT 
373 (Mélanges Michel Virally ed., 1991). 
 22. See generally David A. Colson, How Persistent Must the Persistent Objector Be?, 61 WASH. 
L. REV. 957 (1986). 
 23. COMMITTEE ON THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GENERAL) INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF 
GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (2000) [hereinafter ILA REPORT] (“As a matter of 
policy, the persistent objector rule could be regarded as a useful compromise. It respects States’ 
sovereignty and protects them from having new law imposed on them against their will by a majority; 
but at the same time, if the support for the new rule is sufficiently widespread, the convoy of the law’s 
progressive development can move forward without having to wait for the slowest vessel.”). 
 24. States which simultaneously advocate the persistent objector rule and the Mandatory View 
enjoy the benefit of a useful and flexible tool. While the persistent objector rule allows a state to 
withdraw from a general rule and adopt an isolationist legal policy when it is unable to influence the 
formation of a general rule, the Mandatory View (which the persistent objector rule assumes) also 
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the role of consent with—or more accurately, replacing it by—the ill-defined 
conditions of the persistent objector rule renders it incoherent, and there is 
much that is counter-intuitive in the Mandatory View.25 
Those who subscribe to the Mandatory View hold that a state’s consent 
is not required for it to be bound by a rule of customary law, but they 
nevertheless uphold the persistent objector theory.26 This involves 
maintaining a distinction between a silent state and a dissenting state; the 
former is bound by a general rule, but the latter is not. If a state is bound by a 
rule of custom in spite of its dissent, there must be a system of majority rule in 
customary international law; but the entire rationale for the persistent objector 
rule is that there is no system of majority rule. This is because state will is an 
important criterion, if not the main criterion, in the process of custom-
formation. But if state will is the criterion, it should be the criterion for all 
states, whether they are silent or dissenting states. So why do silent states find 
themselves in a different situation from dissenting states under the Mandatory 
View/persistent objector theory? The explanation provided appears to be that 
states are given the chance, and the legal burden, to exempt themselves during 
the permissible period, and that that is the extent of the role allowed for their 
individual consent. The difficulty with this explanation is that it is counter-
intuitive to see how customary international law, an informal process, is 
reduced by the persistent objector theory to a system requiring early 
notification of views as if it were a process containing readily identifiable and 
applicable criteria.27 Furthermore, the persistent objector rule means that 
states have agreed between themselves to set up a system that denies them the 
option of remaining neutral. The persistent objector rule apparently 
 
enables that state to project its own preferred rule as the general rule whenever it is likely to succeed in 
doing so. 
 25. See, for example, Stein, supra note 4, at 477-78, which points out a further problem with the 
persistent objector theory. It is sometimes said to be premised on a theory of vested or acquired rights or 
interests. Because it requires there to be a general rule, however, it goes against the principle of 
intertemporal law, which requires, at least in some of its versions that the validity, not just of the 
acquisition of a right, but also of its continued existence, be conditioned by the evolution of law. If the 
general rule (a condition precedent for the operation of the persistent objector theory), which is binding 
on all states, means that the universal law on a given issue is changed, the continued existence of the 
persistent dissenter's acquired rights will become dependent on the new law, and it will be trying to seek 
exemption from the application of the general rule. This problem would be much reduced for the 
consensual theory, since it does not depend on the existence of a general rule, but on individual 
positions adopted by states. 
 26. See, e.g., Akehurst, supra note 17; ILA REPORT, supra note 23, at 30. 
 27. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 444-45 (1989) (“Even if the State is hard pressed so as not to be able to deny the 
inter alios existence of the norm, it will still have the possibility of qualifying itself as a persistent 
objector as it may argue that it learned about the norm (or that the norm was intended to apply in 
respect of it, too) only now and thus voice its ‘objection’ at the moment of application.”). 
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encourages states to dissent as early as possible even if in doubt, and 
presumably even in circumstances in which the realities of international 
relations may render such objections unusual or unpopular.28 This, again, 
neither accords with intuition nor appears to reflect how states behave. 
Surely if states claim the right to dissent, it is because they do not wish to 
be bound by rules they find unacceptable, and they therefore do not wish to 
subscribe to majority rule. This surely cannot be taken to mean that states 
wish to be bound if they are silent or uninterested or do not wish to commit 
themselves one way or another for practical-political reasons, or if they 
commence their dissent too late. As Charney, an avowed non-consensualist, 
has put it, “[g]overnment officials are jealous of their state’s sovereignty and 
autonomy and are loath to adopt rules that bind dissenters. For they know that 
at some point their state may be on the dissenting side of the issue.”29 To say 
that the very existence of a right to dissent confirms the existence of a rule 
that states are bound unless they are persistent objectors is to take state 
practice too literally. Such an assumption gives too much import to what 
states say about what they do and the moments when they do not say 
anything, as opposed to what states actually do and understand themselves to 
be doing. The fact that states claim a right to dissent does not necessarily 
imply that they normally mean to be bound without their consent, and a 
general consensual explanation of the role of dissent makes much more sense 
than the explanation provided by the persistent objector theory. As one 
commentator, has put it, the right to dissent cannot be regarded as “merely an 
annex in the general theory of custom,”30 which is precisely the role the 
persistent objector theory ascribes to it. 
III. THE WAY STATES ARTICULATE CLAIMS ABOUT 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
It has been argued that a consensual explanation is not convincing 
because it does not reflect the reality of the way in which states make claims 
about customary international law. 31 States, and tribunals, do not normally 
 
 28. See ELIAS & LIM, supra note 3, at 96-97. 
 29. Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 550 (1993). 
 30. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 27, at 443. 
 31. ILA REPORT, supra note 23, at 24 (“[n]o international court or tribunal has ever refused to hold 
that a State was bound by a rule of alleged general customary international merely because it had not 
itself actively participated in the practice in question or deliberately acquiesced in it. In other words, it 
is not necessary to prove the individual consent of a State for it to be bound by a rule of general law. 
There have been several cases in which the International Court, for instance, has taken it for granted 
that the State concerned would be bound by the rule if it could be shown that the other criteria for the 
formation of general customary law were satisfied. This is also generally the position taken by States, 
and there have been no substantial challenges to this proposition.”). 
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concern themselves with demonstrating individual consent, and focus instead 
on the establishment of generally applicable rules to support their position. In 
many cases, they leave it at that, and do not refer to the consent of the state 
against which the rule is to be applied. As has been argued, the whole reason 
why so much time is spent trying to establish the generality of a practice 
would seem to be the fact that if it is established, the rule having that attribute 
will be binding on all. The normal way in which arguments are formulated 
before the International Court, for example, is by one party arguing that a 
practice is sufficiently general, and therefore that custom exists, which 
consequently binds the other state who has in fact consented to it. The other 
party will normally argue that the rule is not sufficiently general, and as a 
result does not exist, thus is not binding on it, and that in any case it has not 
consented to the rule and has even dissented therefrom. This has happened, 
for example, in every case before the International Court in which the 
requirements of customary law were scrutinized. 32 But this is not a feature 
only of the pleadings before international tribunals; diplomatic 
correspondence normally refers to “generally accepted rules,” or even 
“established international law,” and domestic legislation purports to be based 
on rights conferred by international law.33 What are the implications of this 
form of argumentation for the consensual theory? Let us consider the issue 
from the point of view of the state that denies the application of a rule to itself. 
Such a state can do one of two things. First, it may concede that there is a rule, 
but maintain that that rule is not binding on it. Second, rather than denying its 
scope or applicability, the state may deny the existence of the rule itself. Now, 
as far as that state is concerned, it is not (or at least it seeks to show that it is 
not) under an obligation, whether on the basis of the absence of a rule or on 
the basis of the non-applicability of the rule to itself. It would seem to be a 
legitimate inference to conclude that the state denying the 
existence/applicability of a custom has not consented to that custom; the fact 
that that consent is sufficient (even if not necessary) to bind a state is not 
contested. It would appear to be a question of argumentative strategy. 
Showing that a rule does not exist, as a means of avoiding obligations 
imposed by that rule, is more convincing and less difficult to concede than 
showing that the rule exists but that for some reason—such as lack of 
consent—that rule is not applicable. It is safer to present one’s view as the 
orthodox view, and not to portray oneself as the dissident.34 To recall a well-
 
 32. See generally ELIAS & LIM, supra note 3, ch. III. 
 33. Id. at 110-11. 
 34. See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 27, at 444 (“The objection may concern the norm’s erga omnes 
validity, not merely its application . . . . These States deny that any such custom has emerged. It is 
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known example from the 1980s, the United States did not deny a customary 
law obligation to refrain from unilateral exploitation of the ocean floor on the 
basis of its persistent objection; the United States argued that there was no 
such customary law.35 Our forensic sensibilities suggest that a more searching 
view and acute understanding of state practice on the recognition of 
customary rules is required. Our experience about the actual conduct of 
international diplomacy should also feature in our understanding of state 
practice because of what such experience will tell us about the unspoken 
habits which states observe when contesting a customary rule. Such habits are 
in turn an element of state practice. 
For the reasons above, it would seem strange to suggest that arguing on 
the basis of a right to dissent is necessarily a concession to majority rule.36 A 
state is merely seeking to avoid an obligation; the lack of precision as to what 
amounts to a general custom, or a perceived high standard of proof for the 
establishment of a restrictive rule, would seem to be attractive avenues to 
achieving this end.37 The persistent objector rule is less attractive. 
In sum, it is doubtful whether a state that denies the existence of a 
general rule is really manifesting opinio juris to the effect that all rules 
supported by general practice are binding on all states, including itself. 
Arguing that a rule does not exist in no way necessarily implies that if that 
rule did exist, it would be binding. The whole point of arguing in that way is 
to show the state involved does not: (a) recognize the obligations flowing 
from that rule; or (b) has not accepted the rule. The argument between states 
about customary law is not disinterested dialogue. Claims made in concrete 
cases about customary law must be viewed in the context in which they were 
made, being mindful always of the purpose and meaning behind the ways in 
which states contest customary rules. 
 
because the objection can always be formulated in such a manner that we remain incapable of 
delimiting the category of persistent objectors.”). 
 35. See statement of Ambassador Elliott Richardson, in THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON 
THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFFICIAL RECORDS, Vol. IX, (1982) 103-04 (“But the United States could not 
accept the suggestion that, without its consent, other States would be able, by resolutions or statements, 
to deny or alter its rights under international law.” He also stated, concerning resolution 27/49, that it 
was apparent from the text, and from statements made at the time of its adoption, that “the intention had 
not been to impose it as an interim deep-sea bed mining régime, rather it had been intended as a general 
basis for further negotiation of an internationally agreed régime.”). 
 36. Lobo de Souza, supra note 16, at 533. 
 37. Serge Sur, Discussion, in CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING 127 (Antonio 
Cassese & Joseph H. Weiler eds., 1988) (“There are cases where a custom is itself the object of dispute, 
where its applicability is directly at issue, where the parties do not agree as to the opposability of the rule. 
When the Court is faced with such a hypothesis, it indisputably gives the palm . . . to the consensualist 
solution. But when it has to do with customs which are not in dispute, customs which are simply an element 
in its reasoning, it utilises them in a much more flexible manner.”). 
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Regarding withdrawal, a state that does not wish to have a given rule of 
custom applied to it will not typically say “[t]his is the law that everyone 
accepts, but we will now withdraw from it” (“where everyone would 
recognize that what we are doing is that we are withdrawing from it”). A state 
is more likely to argue that there is no general custom requiring conduct to 
which it does not wish to subscribe, and would most likely argue in favour of 
a rule that supports its preferred course of action.38 
IV. CONSENSUALISM THEN AND NOW 
The complex way in which states argue about the basis of customary 
international law does not appear to be properly explained by those who 
claim empirical support for the Mandatory View. 
We must depart from the usual doctrinal explanations and canonical 
understandings.  Part of what we have said about the complex ways in 
which states argue about the basis of customary international law is 
attributable to the inherent vagueness of legal rules.39 It is precisely because 
legal certainty is notoriously lacking when dealing with contestation over 
customary rules that the Mandatory View is attractive. The Mandatory 
View’s doctrines and canons provide hope and a verisimilitude of certainty 
while at all times appearing, facially at least, to comport with what states 
say about what they do. Yet the Mandatory View’s explanations cloud our 
understanding of the true facts of how states actually go about recognizing 
customary rules. We also question the suppression of the infinite variety of 
contexts in which customary law disputes occur.40 What makes the basis of 
customary international law extremely complex for scholars is that the 
conditions under which withdrawal can take place are often caught up in 
legal interpretative dispute. In such a context, states will not argue for the 
existence of inconvenient rules, or for the truth of inconvenient legal 
interpretations. A further complication is that states do not always say what 
they mean, or mean what they say. In so doing, they do not mean to deny 
the existence of a legal rule when they mean instead to deny the application 
of that rule to themselves, but they may say that they do in order to make 
their case more compelling. Understanding such facts about state behavior 
means accepting that states do not necessarily take the Mandatory View 
seriously to be the theoretical basis of customary international law, as 
 
 38. See Maurice H. Mendelson, Practice, Propaganda and Principle in International Law, in 42 
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 1989 1, 9 (Roger Rideout & Jeffery Jowell ed., 1990) (“[I]f you can present 
your demand as an existing right, it is the other government who would ostensibly be disturbing the 
status quo by denying it, and not by you making the demand.”). 
 39. ELIAS & LIM, supra note 3, at 69, 259-60, 289-92. 
 40. Id. at 261. 
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opposed to being sometimes a convenient fiction about how customary 
international law is formed. 
While we recognize some of the merits in having a widespread 
acceptance of the Mandatory View—i.e., that it facilitates law creation and 
the ability to make general statements of what “the law” is—we also 
consider the need for simplicity. In our opinion, there is much to commend 
the view that international law scholarship should focus on the central 
methodological importance of establishing the opposability of a customary 
rule to a particular state without always having to address complex 
questions about general customary international law. This requires a re-
orientation of how we think about the importance of international law. If 
one is concerned with the human rights situation in Country X, is it really 
more important to demonstrate that a large number of countries support a 
particular human rights rule than to demonstrate that the rule in question 
applies to Country X? It may be important to the cause of advocating 
human rights protection to say that a large number of countries accept the 
rule in question (“We all accept the rule, yet Country X denies its 
existence”), and the Mandatory View may have rhetorical value in this 
respect, but it is not strictly important as a matter of legal doctrine to prove 
either that a large number of countries accept the rule or that such a broadly 
accepted rule therefore applies to “silent” states. 
Because we were content to show that the Mandatory View is 
conceptually flawed in this way, and theoretically superfluous, we neither 
tried to define the scope for subsequent state “exit” (i.e. subsequent 
objection) as closely as Professor Andrew Guzman has tried to do,41  nor 
did we address the policy desirability of the Mandatory View on rule of law 
or other grounds as Professors Bradley and Gulati have done. Similarly, we 
did not invest in the protection of expectations as a justification for the 
Mandatory View as we were not sure who would decide what these 
expectations are, and whether we mean to derive an a priori “expectation” 
from the collective silence of a large number of states.42 
Instead, we directed our analysis at the purpose or point which states 
have ascribed to custom and the invocation of customary rules.43 This 
question is fundamental and explains the current polarization of scholarly 
opinion between those who advocate a skeptical theory of customary 
 
 41. Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 170-71 
(2005). 
 42. ELIAS & LIM, supra note 3, at 83-84. 
 43. Id. at 267; see also, RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
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international law,44 and those who support the systemic rule of law and 
policy concerns underlying the Mandatory View. At one end, state practice 
is seen only as bare self-interested behavior,45 while at the other end, the 
Mandatory View’s systemic concerns leads its proponents towards a 
majoritarian,46 or even a deductive theory of customary international law47 
(some versions of which do not even accept the importance of state practice 
and thus do not allow for understanding such practice). One promising 
approach seeks to avoid these extremes by drawing our attention back to 
the central importance of accounting for actual state behavior, while 
maintaining fidelity to customary international law scholarship’s traditional 
concern—i.e., the need to understand how states might actually act in a 
cooperative manner under color of law.48 This approach is derived from the 
behavioral preoccupations of economic analysis. 
Our view proceeds from a separate stream of legal thought altogether; 
one which takes questions about meaning and legal uncertainty seriously. 
While states may disregard, acknowledge as obligatory and/or follow 
general customary rules, they also contest the scope and meaning of 
customary rules. Unlike the Mandatory View, however, we see customary 
international law certainty as something which is inherently problematic. 
When contesting the scope and purpose of a rule, states may not always 
express the theories they hold about how a rule of custom comes into place. 
In any case, they may have different theories about how custom is 
formed.49 A final complication is that a state which finds it disagreeable to 
dissent constantly has reasons based in argumentative strategy to present its 
attempt to modify a supposed general rule to suit its circumstances as a 
denial of a general customary rule instead. In either case, such a state does 
not concede the existence of a general rule, i.e., by seeming to claim a right 
to dissent therefrom. Thus, what is claimed is the need for consent. 
Demonstrating that the Mandatory View is conceptually flawed, or 
that its picture of how states behave is incomplete and misleading, is not 
the only task at hand for contemporary customary international law 
 
 44. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1113 (1999). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 12, at 531-532; Charney, supra note 12, at 1-2; Condorelli, supra 
note 12, at 202-207. 
 47. See, e.g., International Status of South-West Africa, 150 I.C.J. 174,175-178; Kopelmanas, 
supra note 9; Scelle, supra note 9; Le Fur, supra note 9. 
 48. See JOEL P. TRATCHMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008), 113 
(“CIL rules may be coterminous with self-interest.”). 
 49. ELIAS & LIM, supra note 3, at 95, 112-113. See de Souza, supra note 16, at 539; Suganami, 
supra note 16, at 175. 
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scholarship. Recent efforts have contributed significantly to furthering our 
understanding of what it means, in policy terms, to reject the Mandatory 
View. Professors Bradley’s and Gulati’s important article on withdrawal 
from custom stands out as a fine example of that contribution. 
 
